“I Owe More to the Royal Favor, Than Any Merit I Posses Can Justly Claim”: The Loyalists As Transactional Leaders

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Abstract

Aim: This study examined the Loyalists and their embrace of transactional leadership style during the American Revolution.

Methods: The study relied on primary and secondary historical sources and scholarship on transactional leadership. These included general histories, biographies, memoirs, sermons, public statements, and diaries.

Results: In their efforts to oppose the American Revolution, the Loyalists relied on transactional tactics. Despite their prominence, wealth, offices, and connections, the Loyalists proved ineffective in opposing the transformational forces unleashed by the Revolution.

Conclusion: While they included some of the most prominent political and religious leaders in the colonies, the Loyalists failed to stop the American Revolution, mainly due to their reliance on transactional leadership style.

Recommendations: Studying the Loyalists offers insight into how transactional leadership can prove ineffective in transformational times and settings. When voters and followers demand reform, transactional leadership style and leaders who embrace it will fail to deliver. Scholars should look at the Loyalists as transactional leaders in their efforts to understand the American Revolution.

Keywords: Transactional leadership, the American Revolution, Loyalists, Tories

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INTRODUCTION

On September 25, 1780, as the Vulture, a British sloop, made its way south down the Hudson River to New York City, a passenger on it - about to become the newest general in King George III's army - wrote a letter to George Washington about his recent actions which included fleeing from West Point that morning. Admitting his conduct "may appear inconsistent to the world, which very seldom judges right of any man's actions," Benedict Arnold insisted in his letter to Washington that he had "no favor to ask for myself," as he had "too often experienced the ingratitude of my Country to attempt it." Instead, Arnold asked for 'protection for Mrs. Arnold from every insult and injury that a mistaken vengeance of my County may expose her to" and insisted that any retribution from the American side "ought to fall only on me; she is as good and innocent as an angel, and is incapable of doing wrong" (Lea, 2006, 499-500). In the weeks to come, in his public addresses and correspondence, including in his advice to his new British colleagues and his addresses to recruit former comrades on the American side to follow his example and join the crown's service, Arnold would use much of the same language - asking for favors, offering deals and rewards, even making threats as he began his tenure as a brigadier general in the British army (Lea, 2006).

While he might have been a late convert to the British cause, Arnold sounded much like the Loyalists, more commonly called Tories, including embracing the language of transactional leadership. Taking a page from the mother country, in the years before the American Revolution and throughout the war, Loyalists across North America relied on transactional leadership tactics in politics, religion, and even in their efforts to remake the British Empire. Despite their current obscurity, the Loyalists offer insights into the limits of transactional leadership, especially in the face of fundamental changes to society, politics, and culture. With the U.S. experiencing several major political and cultural upheavals in the first quarter of the 21st Century, the Loyalists and their efforts at leadership in turbulent times remain relevant even if historians and the general public have ignored them.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

During the American Revolution, the Loyalists relied on leadership concepts different from those of their Patriot opponents. In his classic study Leadership, Burns (1978) found that transactional leaders often "have no enduring purposes that holds them together; hence they may go their separate ways" with no "higher purpose" trying them together. Drawing on his background as a historian, biographer, and political activist, in his definition of transactional leadership, Burns included exchanges that "could be economic or political or psychological in nature," ranging from payments to emotional support to the "trading of votes between candidate and citizen or between legislators." (Burns, 1978, 20)

Other scholars without Burns' historical background have drawn similar conclusions on transactional leaders. "Transaction leaders exchange things of value with subordinates to advance their own and their subordinates' agendas," noted Northouse (2013). “Transactional leaders are influential because it is in the best interest of subordinates for them to do what the leader wants." Northouse found that transactional leaders rely heavily on offering contingent rewards and management-by-exception, which can include negative feedback, negative reinforcement, and constructive criticism (Northouse, 2013, 195). In short, transactional leaders often fall back on offering the carrot or the stick.

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Building on the work of Burns (1978), Kuhnert and Lewis (1987) examined transactional leadership, highlighting some of its advantages over other forms of leadership. This study included looking at some transactional leadership tactics, including political strategies ranging from "jobs for votes" and "subsidies for campaign contributions" to "nonconcrete rewards" for followers (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987, 649). Kuhnert and Lewis also showed how constructive/developmental personality theory impacts transactional leadership, including focusing on the imperial stage, which includes individuals motivated by "personal goals and agendas," and the interpersonal stage, which has "interpersonal connections" and "mutual obligations" providing motivation (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987, 651-653).

The Loyalists relied on connections and obligations, including patronage such as contracts and salaries, to hold political and religious offices throughout North America. While relying on supporters in Great Britain for the power they wielded, Loyalists holding political offices in the colonies often tried to build similar structures to bind subordinates to them. Other Loyalists outside of politics, including those serving in the Church of England’s hierarchy, also relied on transactional leadership. Across the colonies, most of the established church’s ministers belonged to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which relied on connections in Great Britain for support. Even as Loyalists crafted their plans to reform the British Empire in a futile effort to keep the American colonies as part of it, they tipped their cards, showing how much they relied on transactional leadership.

While the Loyalists are obviously the focus of more historical scholarship than leadership studies, a few scholars have offered works that touched on both disciplines, including Robert Calhoon. While Calhoon (1973) focused on providing a survey of Loyalism, he also offered great insights into how several of its chief advocates relied on transactional leadership when it came to preserving royal authority, including on the political stage, in the legal system, and churches. Calhoon also offered an overview of the Loyalists stretching from New Hampshire to Georgia.

Other surveys of the Loyalists also show that they relied on transactional leadership tactics. These include Labaree’s (1948) who highlighted how the Loyalists relied on a network of schools, churches, businesses, plantations, government positions, and contracts to reward family members and allies in their efforts to preserve their power and maintain order. Nelson (1992) found that various diverse groups supported Loyalism while still relying on transactional relationships to advance their cause. Brown (1969) portrayed how the Loyalists were so trapped in transactional relationships that they misread events and grew out of touch with their fellow colonists. Brown also convincingly showed that the Loyalists helped undermine the British cause by sharing their flawed views with the British military, leading to top generals overestimating the strength of the crown’s cause. In an earlier work, Brown (1965) took that analysis to each of the thirteen colonies with mixed results.

Other historians have shown how some Loyalists who fled North America for Great Britain, usually London, relied on their contacts and connections to lobby the British government. Norton (1972) found the Loyalists often hurt their efforts by focusing more on using their connections to obtain personal financial relief than advocating for more aggressive military actions. More recently, Jasanoff (2011) portrayed how the Loyalists and their values, including transactional leadership, helped secure the empire in Canada, the Caribbean, Africa, and other colonies during
the early nineteenth century, allowing Britain to quickly recover from losing the Revolutionary War to become the world’s premier power.

There have also been some excellent biographies of the Loyalists holding political office, which have revealed their use of transactional leadership tactics. Bailyn’s (1974) study on Thomas Hutchinson remains important after five decades. Skemp (1990) focused on William Franklin, one of the most important and representative Loyalists whose transactional leadership - like much of his life - had been lost in his father's shadow. Skemp (1994) also looked at the tensions that divided the Franklins, hinting at how Benjamin Franklin’s transformational leadership clashed with the transactional leadership embraced by his son. Wilderson (1994) chronicled the rise of John Wentworth to become governor of his native New Hampshire, showing how he relied on his connections both at home and in London during his political climb.

Loyalists in the clergy have also received their share of attention, and several books have revealed their dependence on transactional leadership. In his recent study, Frazer (2018) highlighted how Loyalist religious leaders, almost all of whom were pastors for the Church of England, used transactional leadership in their various pulpits. Zimmer (1978) chronicled the life of Jonathan Boucher, one of the most prominent Loyalist ministers, and showed how he depended on transactional leadership in his religious and political efforts.

British politics in the 1760s and 1770s, especially at the parliamentary level, relied heavily on patron-client relationships and patronage. In insightful works on the British government at the start of King George III’s reign, Sir Lewis Namier, one of the most prominent historians of the past century, presented a political culture where party differences and ideology counted for little as connections and self-interest eclipsed them. Namier (1961) portrayed politics in this era as “duels fought in the dark” where individuals maneuvered against each other, more driven by holding power and office than by espousing policies and ideals (Namier, 1961, 129-130). In his looks at Parliament in the late 1750s and early 1760s, Namier classified the largest group of members as the “king’s friends,” politicians who supported whoever was in power so they could continue to secure rewards for themselves, including offices and pensions (Namier, 1955, 19-21). Throughout his works, Namier demonstrated that political leadership at the top of the British during this period relied heavily on transactions and various connections between leaders and followers.

Across the Atlantic, this political culture started to take hold. After the French and Indian War ended in 1763, political leaders across North America who were tied to the crown tried to replicate the mother country’s political system. These replications included expanding the powers of their offices, using patronage to reward followers, and even focusing more on these matters than actual ideological differences. These officials tried to mirror the British political model even as tensions between Great Britain and the colonies increased. The fledgling colony of East Florida, which became part of the empire after the Treaty of Paris, served as an example of these as prominent British leaders and nobles - including the Earl of Egmont, generals like James Grant, members of Parliament like Denys Rolle, and government officials like Andrew Turnbull - maneuvered against each other to secure land, contracts, and power (Mowat, 1943). During the 1760s, Britain created new colonies like the Floridas and Canada, where the crown and royal governments held more power than in well-established colonies. Even in some of the older colonies, the crown sought more power, successfully in Georgia but less so in Pennsylvania. Regardless, some prominent leaders in North America were ready to work with the crown and royal government in their efforts.
Some leading Loyalists held royal offices and tried to bring the dominant political culture in Great Britain, which rested on transactional leadership, to North America. The most prominent of these Loyalist officials was Massachusetts Gov. Thomas Hutchinson. Burns painted Hutchinson, one of the most prominent Loyalist intellectual leaders and a longtime official, as having "knitted together enough judicial, legislative, and administrative authority to be virtually the boss" of the colony. Holding several political offices, Hutchinson used his power to help his numerous relations and supporters with contracts, jobs, and other assistance. Burns noted that "Hutchinson's stoutest supporters" stood at the "top of the pyramid" of a "social and economic hierarchy as set and stable as England's" (Burns, 2013, 69). However, even as Hutchinson used patronage to build up a power base for himself in Massachusetts, he also relied on the support of patrons, including prominent British officials including Lord Hillsborough and Lord Dartmouth, who both served as secretaries of state for the colonies during the 1760s and 1770s (Bailyn, 1974).

However, Hutchinson's reliance on transactional leadership isolated him from his constituents, leading to his staggering downfall. Using patronage and government contacts on both sides of the Atlantic to stay in power, Hutchinson's transactional leadership drew heavy criticism, including from Patriot leaders like James Otis and John Adams. The criticism grew as Hutchinson simultaneously held some of the top positions in the colony, including serving as both lieutenant governor and chief justice despite not being a lawyer. Otis, Adams, and others continued to hammer Hutchinson as he used his positions to reward his followers and even his family members, including tapping his brother-in-law to serve as his lieutenant governor (Bailyn, 1974). Even after a mob ransacked Hutchinson's house during the Stamp Act crisis, Adams could find no sympathy for Hutchinson, instead taking aim at him for his transactional leadership. Adams insisted Hutchinson "has monopolized almost all the Power, of the Government, to himself and his family" and accused him of "endeavouring to procure more, both on this side and the other side the Atlantic" (Butterfield, 1961, 281-282). While he achieved his ambition of becoming governor of Massachusetts, Hutchinson's tenure in office proved tumultuous and ended up with him leaving in disgrace in 1774 to spend the rest of his life in England, where he pinned to return to New England.

Other Loyalists holding political office also relied on transactional leadership. Sir Egerton Leigh, one of the most prominent Loyalists in the southern colonies, offered an unusually blunt and outspoken defense of transactional leadership. Standing against the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly’s decision to send £ 1,500 to help English radical John Wilkes’ legal fund, in a pamphlet published in early 1774, Leigh presented a full-fledged defense of the British political culture and its reliance on transactional leadership. “The best proof of my own candour is to avow my connection with the Crown,” Leigh wrote. “I am a downright Placeman; have been so for nearly twenty years; and that I owe more to the Royal Favor, than any merit I possess can justly claim.” Leigh mocked the “Maxim of the Times,” namely the Patriots’ insistence that all royal officials were corrupt. “I have given a most Disgustful Figure of myself—a monstrous Portrait!” wrote Leigh. “A Man in Place is a perfect Basilisk to a Patriot out of Place.” Leigh stressed that last point, insisting "it being very manifest to all Mankind, that this single circumstance alone, the being in or out of Place, defines and gives the difference, between a Popular Member of the Community, and a Courtier at St. James’s” (Greene, 1970, 63-64). In short, Leigh thought much of the resistance from the Patriots came from their frustrations in not holding royal offices.

Leigh had ample reason to see politics in a transactional light since his career was built on connections, patronage, and holding office. The son of the royally appointed chief justice of South
Carolina, Leigh’s ascent up the colony’s political ladder was rapid as he held a series of offices, including in both chambers of the legislature, surveyor general, a judge of Charles Town’s Vice-Admiralty Court, and attorney general for the colony while still holding local and religious offices. Holding numerous offices concurrently, much like Hutchinson, Leigh was able to dispense patronage and favors throughout the colony even as colonial legislators grumbled about his holding four royal positions simultaneously (Calhoon & Weir, 1969).

However, if transactional leadership tactics helped Leigh ascend, they also contributed to his decline. One of the few defenders of the Stamp Act in South Carolina, Leigh grew increasingly unpopular, in part, to his reliance on transactional leadership. Legislators in the lower house continued to complain that Leigh held too many offices, especially as some of those posts were designed to offer checks and balances to each other. When Leigh used his perch at the Vice-Admiralty Court to favor royal officials over local merchants, including his wife’s uncle Henry Laurens, South Carolinians turned against him, especially as this family feud led to an acrimonious and often personal pamphlet battle (Calhoon et al., 1969). A skilled writer and sharp polemicist, Leigh was rewarded for his service for the crown with a baronetcy, only to become a political and social pariah after his affair with his wife’s sister and his clumsy attempts to hide it—including isolating her on a boat which led to the death of their newborn infant—became public knowledge. (Calhoon, 1973)

Leigh remained a staunch Loyalist during the war, working in both London and America for the British cause. Despite his public disgrace, Leigh again relied on transactional strategies as he attempted a political comeback, trying to pull strings to become governor of South Carolina after British forces captured Charles Town in 1780. While Leigh once again held several positions at once, including serving as intendant of Charles Town, on the city’s Board of Police, and the British military’s advisory council, the governorship eluded him. He died in September 1781, a few weeks before Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown (Calhoon & Weir, 1969).

Other prominent Loyalists also rose to power due to transactional leadership strategies, even if they articulated them less forcefully than Leigh. Despite being born out of wedlock, another royal official who relied on his family’s connections obtained a prize that eluded Leigh—a colonial governorship. While he is best known today for how the Revolution tore his family apart, William Franklin, the illegitimate but acknowledged son of Benjamin Franklin, ranked as one of the most influential royal officials in the decade before American independence. Unlike his father, who Burns portrayed as having "formed the backbone of an unprecedented collective leadership that transformed the American people," the younger Franklin was far more of a transactional leader (Burns, 2003, 76). As Benjamin Franklin grew more politically prominent, his son worked closely with him, including at the Albany Congress in 1754 when the elder Franklin drafted his plan to establish a single government for the 13 colonies (Epstein, 2017). His father's patronage secured William Franklin a host of offices, including the clerkship of the Pennsylvania Assembly, postmaster of Philadelphia, and comptroller general of the British postal service in North America (Randall, 1984). When his father led efforts to transform Pennsylvania from a proprietary colony to one under royal control and went to London to advocate for the proposed change, William Franklin came with him. He served as his secretary for his father as they lobbied the British government on the matter (Skemp, 1994). During his time in England, the younger Franklin studied law at the Middle Temple. This experience shaped his subsequent career and established the contacts he relied on during his quick rise in colonial politics (Epstein, 2017).
While in London, William Franklin found a patron who could help him even more than his father. Working as an agent for the Maryland Assembly, the younger Franklin had the chance to meet with Lord Bute, a mentor to King George III and the newly installed prime minister. Franklin met with Bute and members of his government on several different issues (Epstein, 2017). These new connections paid off for Franklin, whose political views evolved during his time in London, and he increasingly drifted away from his father's republicanism. At Bute's recommendation, George III tapped Franklin to serve as governor of New Jersey, the first royal governor appointed by the new king. New Jersey might have ranked as one of the more minor colonies in North America, but Franklin scored a triumph when he was named its governor. For a colonial born out of wedlock in his early 30s, Franklin had done very well for himself, reaping the rewards of transactional leadership (Randall, 1984). After being released, Franklin based himself in New York, where he led the Board of Associated Royalists, which equipped and supported Loyalists serving in the military. In that role, Franklin became one of the leading proponents of more stringent political and military policies. Franklin even hoped to sabotage peace efforts in the last days of the war when he condemned a Patriot prisoner to death. He left for England after Yorktown, generally staying out of politics. Franklin mainly remained isolated from his family back in America, and his father never forgave him for supporting the British cause (Skemp, 1994). While he had some successes, to be sure, William Franklin's transactional leadership, including his heavy reliance on contacts and patronage, helped divide his family.

However, the younger Franklin's reliance on transactional leadership tactics only took him so far. Franklin did a fine job leading New Jersey through the various upheavals and controversies of the 1760s and 1770s, but they eventually proved too much. Pulled between his father on one side and his patrons across the Atlantic on the other, Franklin eventually remained loyal to the crown. In the summer of 1776, New Jersey's Provisional Congress arrested Franklin and sent him to a prison in Litchfield, Connecticut. He spent almost two and a half years in jail, during which his wife died (Skemp, 1994). After being released, Franklin based himself in New York, where he led the Board of Associated Royalists, which equipped and supported Loyalists serving in the military. In that role, Franklin became one of the leading proponents of more stringent political and military policies. Franklin even hoped to sabotage peace efforts in the last days of the war when he condemned a Patriot prisoner to death. He left for England after Yorktown, generally staying out of politics. Franklin mainly remained isolated from his family back in America, and his father never forgave him for supporting the British cause (Skemp, 1994). While he had some successes, to be sure, William Franklin's transactional leadership, including his heavy reliance on contacts and patronage, helped divide his family.

Many other Loyalists turned to transactional leadership strategies to advance up the political ladder. For example, the Marquis of Rockingham, who twice served brief stints as prime minister, guided the career of John Wentworth. Rockingham's patronage helped Wentworth rise to become governor of New Hampshire (Wilderson, 1994). During the war, East Florida Governor Patrick Tonyn successfully lobbied for Thomas Brown, a Loyalist chased out of Georgia, to serve as the British superintendent to the Creek and the Cherokees despite having little experience with Native Americans (Cashin, 1989). Tonyn also championed Brown's efforts to obtain a command post, and despite having next to no military experience, the Loyalist proved an effective cavalry commander who helped keep St. Augustine out of American hands. (Cashin, 1989) While Jonathan Odell was best known for his poetry, William Franklin helped him obtain a position writing propaganda for the British cause during the war (Edelberg, 1987). Loyalist political leaders of all stripes and positions turned to transactional leadership, becoming more concerned about status, offices, and their connections instead of facing growing resistance from their fellow colonists.

Loyalists also relied on transactional leadership at the pulpit and in churches. The Church of England ranked as one of the cornerstones of the Loyalist movement. Thanks to its hierarchy and the significant role of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, the church helped contribute to the transactional character of Loyalism. Many of the leading Loyalist ministers had ties to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which was based in England and often sent pensions
and annual payments across the Atlantic to support the growth of the established church. From New Hampshire to the Floridas, ministers affiliated with the Church of England preached Loyalist values from their pulpits. They have also been written off for their transactional leadership, even being compared to Loyalists holding political offices. "The Loyalism of these men has often been dismissed as the prudent, or at best conscientious, performance of their duty by men who were a species of royal official," wrote Nelson. "But there was more to it than that." Nelson wrote that the core of Loyalist arguments against the Revolution could be found in the writings of members of the Society, including Johnathan Boucher, a minister who led churches in the Chesapeake region, and Charles Inglis, who led Trinity Church in New York. "Lacking confidence both in individual men and in individual generations of men, they were suspicious of anything that broke through the current of custom and took people out of their habits," Nelson wrote about these Loyalists (Nelson, 1992, 186-188).

Many prominent pastors—almost all connected to the Church of England, though there were a few dissident ministers—led Loyalist efforts throughout the American colonies (Frazer, 2018). Facing the political and cultural turmoil that arose in the 1760s and 1770s, these religious leaders, much like Loyalists holding political office, turned to transactional leadership tactics. These strategies included relying on their connections, precedent, established church dogma, the law, and, sometimes, the Bible as they hoped the ties and agreements that made the colonies part of the British Empire remained in place. In his recent study of Loyalist clergy, Frazer looked at several pastors, including Boucher and Inglis, and found all of them relied on biblical interpretations, arguments stressing the importance of relying on traditional authorities and using historical references to defend British rule (Frazer, 2018). Relying on connections, including dishing out rewards and punishments through patronage, Loyalists in the clergy turned to transactional leadership like their allies in politics and government. Indeed, church and state often went hand in hand, and the Church of England usually proved more effective in establishing royal control of the colonies than the official governments (Wood, 1991).

Much like their allies jostling for political positions, some Loyalist ministers often seemed far more concerned with maneuvering for office than guiding their flocks. As the Church of England experienced sudden growth during the 1760s and early 1770s, ministers across North America called for establishing a bishopric in the colonies (Frazer, 2018). A bishop in North America would have been able to consecrate priests in the colonies, ending the need to send prospective clergymen across the Atlantic. St. Peter's in Hebron, Connecticut, highlighted North America's need for a bishop (Cohen, 1977). Over two decades, four prospective priests penciled in to lead St. Peter's died during their trips to England for ordination before Samuel Peters successfully completed the journey and led the church in Hebron despite coming down with a near-fatal case of smallpox in London (Cohen, 1977).

Many of the colonies, especially in New England, and some groups in the Middle Colonies and around the Chesapeake, had been established by dissenting churches. The residents of those colonies retained suspicions and concerns about the growing popularity of the Church of England during the 1760s, which only grew as its ministers called for a bishop in America. This rising tension helped ignite the American Revolution, drawing men like John Adams and Samuel Adams to resist royal authority as it expanded its influence in government and churches (Bailyn, 1967).
Supporters of the Church of England insisted having a bishop in North America would help ensure a better relationship with Great Britain (Labaree, 1948). As dissenting churches ramped up the opposition to having a bishop in North America, mainly through the effort of Miles Cooper, supporters of the Church of England rallied together, cooperating across the colonies and laying a foundation for the network they used in the increasingly contentious years to come (Nelson, 1992). The controversy over a bishop in the colonies also allowed several prominent ministers to begin their efforts to obtain a miter. They tried to stand out from their colleagues in urging the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and other church leaders in England to bring bishops to the North American colonies. They also hoped to gain notice and advance up the clerical hierarchy. The pursuit of higher clerical offices mirrored the political transactions that Namier described in Great Britain and which Loyalists used to obtain political office. Samuel Seabury, Charles Inglis, Jonathan Boucher, Thomas Bradbury Chandler, and other ministers started the scramble to become the first North American bishop, and lesser church leaders soon followed suit (Frazer, 2018). Just as Loyalists used transactional leadership tactics to obtain political office, ministers and pastors followed suit as they sought more power and status in the church.

Perhaps more than any of the other Loyalist ministers, Boucher revealed how much transactional leadership influenced the thoughts of these religious leaders. Born in Cumberland, Boucher came from an impoverished family. Looking back on his childhood when in his late 40s, Boucher wrote, "we lived in such a state of penury and hardship as I have never since seen equalled, no, not even in parish almshouses" (Boucher, 1967a, 9). Despite that poverty, which was only worsened by an alcoholic father, Boucher took advantage of several opportunities to further his education and find patrons, eventually becoming a teacher and moving to Virginia in the late 1750s (Zimmer, 1978). Once in the colonies, Boucher entered the clergy while remaining in education. During the 1760s and early 1770s, he had a knack for building ties to some of the most prominent leaders in the colonies, including Sir Robert Eden, the last royal governor of Maryland, and George Washington. Washington's stepson, Jackie Custis, studied under Boucher and even boarded with him (Calhoon, 1973).

During the leadup to the Revolution, Boucher ranked as one of the most vocal Loyalists in the public square. From his pulpit, Boucher repeatedly praised the British political system and the transactional relationships that held it together. Boucher insisted that men were "so disorderly and unmanageable, that, were it not for the restraints and the terrors of human laws, it would not be possible for us to dwell together." Indeed, Boucher even claimed that God supported the government. "It is fair to infer that government was…the original intention of God," Boucher said before turning to class divisions and patron-client relationships. "As soon as there were some to be governed, there were also some to govern." Boucher insisted that even the angels were governed before offering a very late take on the divine rights of monarchs. "There is no power, but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God." Boucher championed the British government—and its transactional aspects, including the give-and-take politics—as a proper, even divinely ordained, use of authority (Boucher, 1967b, 523-530).

Turning to history and the Bible, Boucher pointed to several examples of benevolent rulers and monarchs. Repeatedly in the 1770s, Boucher invoked the Bible as he pushed back against criticism of the British government. In a sermon in 1774 on the strife between Abraham and Lot, Boucher offered a lengthy defense of Great Britain's colonial policies, including the economic and political ties across the Atlantic (Boucher, 1967b). Also, that year, Boucher focused on 2 Samuel,
comparing the growing Patriot movement to the traitors Absalom and Ahithophel while insisting that the royal government was blessed by God and defending its authority. (Boucher 1967b) Of course, Boucher was being supported by the Church of England, notably the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. After fleeing Maryland in 1775, Boucher ended up as part of the leadership of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, rising to become its undersecretary and commanding a healthy salary (Zimmer, 1978).

Other Loyalists in the ministry also relied on transactional leadership. Ordained a deacon in London in 1766, and as a priest a year later, Jonathan Odell relied on the assistance of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel to take over a church in Burlington, New Jersey. Once there, Odell turned to William Franklin for help, and the governor served as a patron for him at the local level (Edelberg, 1987). Even their enemies recognized Loyalists in the clergy as transactional leaders. Despite knowing each other through shared ties at Yale, Ezra Stiles, a Congregationalist minister and supporter of the Patriot cause, was a fierce critic of Samuel Peters. Having sparred with him over politics and religion over the years, Stiles was glad to see a mob chase Peters out of Connecticut. In his diary, Stiles wrote that Peters insisted “fled to Boston, to embark for England & tell the King his Story, get a Pension and perhaps a Bishoprick for his suffering in the Cause of Government as it is called” (Stiles, 1901, 497). Just like Thomas Hutchinson drew fire from John Adams for relying on transactional leadership, Peters garnered criticism from Stiles.

Several leading Loyalists offered reform plans on how the colonies could remain part of the empire and assume a larger share of power and responsibility. Starting while serving in the First Continental Congress in 1774, during the war, Joseph Galloway, one of the most powerful legislators in Pennsylvania and a key ally to both of the Franklins, unveiled a series of "Plans of Union." Galloway’s plans, which he continued working on even after the war was over, incorporated many elements of federalism. The Pennsylvania Loyalist’s plans included a host of legal checks and balances while expanding government to give royal officials - mainly the crown and the colonial governors which Galloway was allied with - more authority and patronage (Boyd, 1970). William Smith, the Loyalist who served as colonial chief justice for New York and, after the war, Quebec, offered a series of reforms, proposing an expanded colonial government, which would have created an American parliament and more power for the royal governors (Calhoon, 1973). After the war, Jonathan Sewall, Massachusetts's last colonial attorney general and a key ally of Thomas Hutchinson, offered similar plans for the North American colonies and Canada specifically (Berkin, 1974). These alternatives would have empowered colonial officials, including expanding patronage opportunities for Loyalist leaders like Hutchinson, William Franklin, and Smith and Sewall. Transactional leadership was at the heart of Loyalist attempts to redesign the British Empire and increase their opportunities to build their power base through patronage.

After the Vulture arrived in New York at the end of September 1780, Benedict Arnold quickly dove into his new duties as he began his career in the British service. Hearing that the Patriots executed Maj. John Andre, the captured spy who had been his contact on the British side, Arnold wrote George Washington on the matter, reminding his former commander that his wife and child were still in American custody. "Necessity compelled me to leave behind me in your camp a wife and offspring that are endeared to me by every sacred tie," Arnold wrote Washington. "If any violence be offered to them, remember I will revenge their wrongs in a deluge of American blood" (Lea, 2006, 544).
Right before being named a British general on October 9, Arnold sat down with William Smith, the New York attorney who had drafted a proposal for imperial reform back in the 1760s in which he called for creating an American parliament (Calhoon, 1973). Torn between his Whig sensibilities and his desire for the colonies to remain part of the British Empire, Smith finally joined the British side in 1778 and was named the colony's chief justice the following year. Smith also handled some intelligence matters and helped Arnold as a ghostwriter during his first weeks on the British side (Benton, 1969).

In his various proclamations issued in October, with Smith's assistance, Arnold showcased much of what made Loyalists transactional leaders. In an address to the general public, Arnold offered a legalistic defense of his conduct, insisting that the British government had rectified the "grievances" that he and the Patriots first had. Noting that he supported the Declaration of Independence, Arnold claimed "many plausible reasons were urged," but they "no longer exist" since "Great Britain, with the open arms of a parent, offered to embrace us as children and grant the wished for remedy." Arnold went on to rant about the alliance with France, insisting the French were America's "worst enemies" and "the enemy of the Protestant faith, and fraudulently avowing an affection for the liberties of mankind, while she holds her native sons in subservience and chain." Reviewing peace overtures the British made in 1778, Arnold thought the Americans should accept them. "I find solid ground to rely upon the clemency of our sovereign and abundant conviction that it is the glorious intention of Great Britain, not only to have the rights and privileges of the colonies unimpaired, together with their personal exemption from taxation, but to add such further benefits as may consist with the common prosperity of the empire." Arnold even claimed to have "fought for much less than the parent country is as willing to grant to her collies, as they can be to receive or enjoy" (Lea, 2006, 544-546). Later in October, Arnold was more direct, issuing a proclamation and offering bounties to soldiers who decided to leave Washington's army to join the British (Lea, 2006).

But Arnold’s message failed to inspire his old colleagues and comrades on the American side to follow him into the crown’s service. Even as Arnold made his case to “the Inhabitants of America,” he also demanded £10,000 from Sir Henry Clinton, the British commander in North America, which he claimed Andre had promised him if he switched sides and the British failed to capture West Point. On October 18, Clinton authorized paying Arnold £6,350 though, as a brigadier general, Arnold had an annual salary of £650 and a pension of £225 for the rest of his life (Randall, 1990). Regardless, Arnold's deciding to switch sides for ample compensation revealed far more of his transactional leadership than his public proclamations.

Of course, Arnold joined the British only a year before Yorktown, and while he became unpopular in Great Britain and in Canada, he was able to live with his family in London a quarter century after betraying the American cause (Randall, 1990; Merrill & Endicott, 2022)/ Still, Arnold fared better than most of the other Loyalists, even as many of them continued to rely on legalisms, patron-client relationships, and connections long after American independence. When he published his sermons pertaining to the American Revolution in 1797, Jonathan Boucher dedicated the book to his old friend George Washington, praising his service as president leading a new government "framed under the British model" and "resisting those anarchical doctrines" that led to independence (Boucher, 1967b, Dedication). To his credit, after getting a copy of the book, Washington thanked Boucher and praised him as a man of principle, although, apparently, he had never read the collected sermons (Zimmer, 1978).
Boucher and other Loyalist ministers also hoped to become bishops. While he came close to obtaining bishoprics in Canada and Scotland, Boucher fell short of his ambitions each time (Zimmer, 1978). During the 1780s, Samuel Peters lobbied the British government, serving as something of an agent for his fellow Connecticut Loyalists (Norton, 1972). Just as his old enemy Ezra Stiles had predicted, Peters also hoped to become a bishop, unsuccessfully looking to be named to lead Nova Scotia. He eventually was named, but never consecrated, to serve as bishop of Vermont (Cohen, 1977). Still using his pen to write poetry, Jonathan Odell angled for a Canadian bishopric (Edelberg, 1987). He settled in New Brunswick, where he held political office and found success in rebuilding his life (Edelberg, 1987). Other Loyalists who held office in the colonies hoped for future preference. Some of them proved successful, including Jonathan Sewall, William Smith, and John Wentworth, who held office in Canada. Other Loyalists like Jonathan Galloway and William Franklin never found success in their attempts to make political comebacks.

Long after the Revolution ended, some Loyalists remained reliant on transactional leadership. During the war, Thomas Brown, the Georgia Loyalist who defended East Florida, relied on Governor Patrick Tonyn's patronage to become superintendent to the Creek and the Cherokees. Brown wrote Lord Liverpool, the prime minister, offering his services during the War of 1812 to rally Native Americans to the British cause. Brown, then a prominent planter on St. Vincent, assured Liverpool that he had the connections to reach the Native Americans even though he had not been to Georgia or Florida for three decades. "There is no person in Great Britain who possess interest and influence to detach these Indians from the Americans except myself," Brown insisted (Cashin, 1989, 213). While Liverpool rejected the offer, Brown’s letter showed just how much transactional leadership guided the Loyalists, even when it flew in the face of reality.

**METHODOLOGY**

Burns (1978) first employed the use of the phrase “transactional leadership” in Leadership. Burns pointed to financial transactions and legislative dealmaking and found transactional leadership far less effective and lasting than transforming leadership. “The object in these cases is not a joint effort for personals with common aims acting for the collective interests of followers but a bargain to aid the individual interests of persons or groups going their separate ways,” Burns noted (Burns, 1978, 425). While Burns created the term two centuries after the Loyalists were run off the public stage, it accurately covers the leadership strategies they employed.

Historians have increasingly examined the Loyalists in recent years, ensuring a better understanding of their leadership tactics. Besides including scholarship focused on leadership, a look at the Loyalists and their leadership tactics requires examining secondary sources, including political and religious histories, biographies, and studies of British political culture in the 18th century. Primary sources, including correspondence, memoirs, sermons, public statements, and diaries also offer insights into the Loyalists and their leadership styles.

**RESEARCH FINDINGS**

Mostly forgotten outside specialists on the American Revolution, the Loyalists attempted to replicate a political culture based on transactional leadership in the North American colonies. Entering into patron-client relationships with leading British officials and religious leaders, including the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, the Loyalists tried to rule the colonies along the lines of what elites did across the Atlantic. However, they failed to do so because they
often focused on Great Britain instead of their constituents and congregants back home. Instead of seeing it as a necessary part of operating government, increasing numbers of colonists viewed patronage as a cornerstone for corruption (Wood, 1991). Torn between their connections in Great Britain and rising opposition in the colonies, the Loyalists could offer little, especially in light of the transformations that accompanied the American Revolution. Facing one of the most transformative movements in world history, the Loyalists turned to the traditional bonds that had been in place for decades: hierarchy, patronage, trade, and connections. Even their efforts to reform the British Empire depended on transactional leadership, including the proposed plans offered by Joseph Galloway, Jonathan Sewall, and William Smith.

The Loyalists serve as a warning for insular political elites who are not focused on their constituents. The Loyalist ranks included some of the most prominent men in the colonies, including political, religious, and intellectual leaders. Almost all of the Loyalist leadership came from well-established families who had led their communities for decades. Some of them were well-established on the political stage. Cadwallader Colden, who kept serving stints as acting governor of New York during the 1760s and 1770s, had begun his political career in the early 1720s (Calhoon, 1973). They had the powers of the colonial governments and the established church behind them.

Despite these advantages, the Loyalists failed and were swept away by the tide of the American Revolution. More than two centuries after their defeat, the Loyalists reveal the limits of transactional leadership, especially in turbulent times. "Revolutionary leadership demands commitment, persistence, courage, perhaps selflessness and even self-abnegation," James MacGregor Burns wrote. "Pragmatic, transactional leadership requires a shrewd eye for opportunity, a good hand at bargaining, persuading, reciprocating. Reform may need these qualities, but it demands much more" (Burns, 1978, 169). No matter how skilled and shrewd they were, the Loyalists could not meet those demands, and an entire generation of political and religious leadership was upended.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In recent decades, American politics has experienced some sudden turns in both presidential and congressional elections. After winning elections, leaders in the White House and on Capitol Hill find that the public does not support their agendas and neither major party is on top for long. Clearly unhappy with the political scene, voters bounce back and forth between the two major parties even as a series of outsiders - Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and even George W. Bush with his lack of federal experience - win presidential elections only to suffer defeats in the off-year elections. Polls continue to show discontent with both major parties, Congress and presidential leadership. In the primaries back in 2016, Trump routed an entire generation of Republican politicians who, like the Loyalists, could only point back to the past, invoking Reagan and doubling down on Bush's foreign policy. While much of the GOP leadership has made its peace with Trump, the elites of both parties - and, therefore, the governing class - are in a precarious position as populist movements and protests on both the left and the right continue to build momentum.

If all the governing class can offer is transactional leadership, it might end up in the dustbin of history - just as the Loyalists were. Despite the passage of 250 years, the experiences of the Loyalists show that leaders facing transformational and even revolutionary times should not rely
on transactional leadership strategies. Whatever the merits of transactional leadership tactics, they often prove inadequate in combatting or curbing transformational or revolutionary forces.

REFERENCES


